

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

June 12, 2015

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** S.A. Stokes, Technical Director

**FROM:** R.K. Verhaagen and J.W. Plaue

**SUBJECT:** Los Alamos Report for Week Ending June 12, 2015

**DNFSB Staff Activity:** On Wednesday, E.M. Gibson conducted a teleconference with LANL and NNSA personnel to discuss the status of efforts on the 2017 update to the probabilistic seismic hazards analysis.

**Plutonium Facility–Restart Activities:** Members of federal readiness assessment (RA) team for the Balance of Machining activity conducted their pre-visit this week. They plan to commence their full review on June 22, 2015. On Monday, the contractor RA team commenced their review of the Isotope Fuels Impact Tester. Last Friday, LANL submitted their request for startup approval and the associated corrective action plan for closure of the findings from the federal RA for the T Base 2 machining activity.

**Plutonium Facility–Configuration Management and Conduct of Operations:** On Monday, facility personnel conducted a fact-finding after the NNSA Facility Representative questioned the conduct of a liquid transfer. Workers had transferred liquid to facilitate sampling of one of the liquids of unknown origin (see 4/3/15 weekly). Participants discussed concerns regarding performance of the transfer using a procedure that expired a year earlier and did not include valve lineups, as required by institutional procedure. The workers noted that they have not historically used valve lineups to support liquid transfers due to the complexity of the system and the fact that most transfer piping and valves in the facility do not possess unique identifiers and are not captured in controlled engineering drawings. Instead, the practice had been to conduct a group walk-down to ensure the correct transfer path. Facility management indicated future transfers would need to rely on completion of formal labeling for enduring systems and use of temporary labeling for those systems planned for removal.

**Plutonium Facility–Safety Basis:** On Wednesday, LANL personnel briefed the Field Office on the state of the safety basis and their proposed remedy. The situation includes: three approved safety basis documents, with only the 2011 version fully implemented; four safety documents that have been submitted, but are not yet approved; and at least six known changes to be submitted in the near future. LANL's proposed remedy is to discontinue implementation efforts for the 2014 documents while pursuing at-risk implementation of the 2015 version, which they submitted to the Field Office in late May. Assuming timely approval from the Field Office, LANL hopes to have the 2015 version implemented in early fall. They anticipate the need to submit a future revision to the 2015 version that will further consolidate outstanding documents and comments.

**Area G–Conduct of Operations:** Last week, in response to a number of recent conduct of operations issues (see 5/29/15 weekly), LANL management appointed a senior supervisory watch (SSW) for Area G, the RANT Shipping Facility, and the Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility. The SSW commenced his duties this week, which include critical and objective oversight of operations and mentoring to operations personnel. LANL management is continuing to study the need for improvements on how management communicates safety basis and facility status decisions to operations staff.

**Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF):** WETF personnel successfully loaded a Flanged Tritium Waste Container with about 5000 Ci of tritium-containing materials. This evolution was conducted to support risk reduction activities and maintain proficiency ahead of the one-year anniversary from the last evolution (see 6/20/14 weekly).